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Abstract 
 
Recent studies in the innovation literature reveal that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
promotes the innovation activities in the recipent country through spillover effects. In 
this paper we extend the existing literature by incooprating the corruption index in the 
estimation procedure. Using a cross-country analysis from the Europe and Central 
Asia (ECA) region , covering 57 countries over the period of 1995-2010, we find no 
evidence of FDI spillover effect on innovative activity. However, corporate corruption 
and expenditure on education sector are positively related to the number of patents 
applications. Our study shed light on the national innovation activities and 
anti-corruption programs.  
 
Keywords: Foreign direct investment; Corruption; Innovation; Technology transfer 
JEL classification:  O32, O34, O38, F21, D73 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The global economy has yet to shake off the fallout from the crisis of 2008-2009. 
Based on estimation of the International Monetary Fund, the gross domestic product 
of eurozone economy will face 0.1% decline in 2013. A long-term policy is needed to 
promote sustainable economic growth. Innovation has been widely recognized as a 
key drive of economic growth and identifying the determinants of innovation is a 
crucial first step for designing effective policies to enhance economic development 
and growth. However, despite several studies on this topic (for instance, (Anokhin and 
Schulze 2009)), there is still limited empirical evidence about how countries can 
promote their innovative capacity. 
 
Corruption is a major obstacle for economic development for developing countries. 
Corruption impedes FDI, increases transaction cost and limits entrepreneur’s market  
(Anokhin and Schulze 2009). More importantly, corruption delay the permission of 
licenses and reduce trust of entrepreneur on institution, therefore it impedes the 
process of innovation. However, some research also shows that corruption can grease 
the wheel of economic development by speeding the bureaucratic process and 
jumping policy hurdle (Wang and You 2012; Chen, Liu et al. 2013). With limited and 
mixed empirical evidence on the influence of corruption on innovation, therefore we 
need to empirically study what is the impact of corruption on innovation. 
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The aim of this research is to make a modest contribution towards filling those 
gaps in existing literature. Our results indicate that research and development 
expenditures and education expense play a critical role in promoting innovative 
activity. However, FDI dose not have any influence on innovation, and surprisingly, 
corruption indeed grease the wheel of economic growth and promote innovative 
capabilities of countries in ECA region. 
 
Obviously, a single empirical research cannot come up with firm conclusions 
about what factors influence innovative activity among all countries. However, it can 
shed some new light on national economic policy issues that are also being 
investigated in other studies on the subject. Our research will help countries in ECA 
regions to develop powerful policy to promote regional economic growth, such as 
focusing on education and R&D. Another contribution of the paper is to reveal the 
effect of corruption on innovative ability. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework of the research. Section 3 presents the data and methodology. Section 4 
describes and discusses the empirical results, and section 5 offers some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
It has been well established in the literature that innovation promote economic 
growth, and an increasing number of researchers start to investigate what factors 
determine the innovative ability of a country in the last few years. One stream of 
literature focuses on the importance of inputs in the production of knowledge, such as 
research and development expense, and number of scientists (Acs, Anselin et al. 2002; 
Furman, Porter et al. 2002). However, new knowledge cannot be produced in vacuum, 
institutional factors, stated by national innovation system theory, are another strong 
determinants for innovation ability (Edquist 1997). Social and economic institutions 
demonstrate the variance of innovation ability among countries, for example, 
economic development (Grande and Peschke 1999), patent rights protection 
(Varsakelis 2001) ,and quality of education (Varsakelis 2006). 
 
FDI has been well recognized as an important factor in national innovation system 
to promote innovative activities through spill-over effect (Baskaran 2008). Local 
firms in host country benefit FDI from a number of ways. First of all, local firms can 
imitate the designs of the new developed product of foreign companies by reverse 
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engineering, and build up new innovative product. Secondly, employment and 
training supplied by foreign firms can enhance the quality of human resource, and 
those skilled labors will move to other factories in host countries, and therefore 
knowledge is transferred to other domestic companies. Thirdly, FDI can produce 
“demonstration effect”. The foreign products in market can stimulate domestic 
competitor’s innovation to generate ideas for innovative product. Lastly, FDI can 
promote technological know-how transfer vertically from foreign investing firms to 
local suppliers through knowledge exchange and training. Then local suppliers can 
develop innovative products based on vertically spillover knowledge. 
 
The outcome of innovation activities is difficult to measure, however the number 
of patent is a good proxy to reflect innovation activities in each countries(Acs, 
Anselin et al. 2002). In this paper, we focus on the definition on the OECD manual 
(OECD 2005), and broadly innovations can be categorized into four different types: 
Product Innovations: Introduction of a good or service that is new or significantly 
improved with respect to its characteristics and intended uses. Process Innovations: 
Implementation of a new or significantly improved production or delivery method. 
This includes significant changes in techniques, equipment and/or software. The 
process innovations can be intended to decrease unit costs of production or delivery. 
Marketing Innovations: Implementation of a new marketing method involving 
significant changes in product placement, promotion etc. Examples of marketing 
innovations include introduction or obtaining new product licensing. Organisational 
Innovations: Implementation of new organisational method in firm’s business 
practices, workplace organisation and external relations. 
 
Another important factor which influences innovative activities is the efficiency of 
political institutions (Varsakelis 2006). In national innovation system, dynamic 
networks of policies and institutions influence knowledge transfer among different 
countries and also within each country’s domestic industries. In order to absorb 
knowledge from foreign countries, an institution needs to implement policies that 
facilitate domestic firms to use and diffuse these technologies within domestic 
industry. Previous research has shown that the intellectual property protection 
framework influences a country’s innovation ability (Varsakelis 2001). A country’s 
ability to enact a law bases on the quality of institutional agencies such as political 
stability and judiciary system. Efficient judiciary system can provide better protection 
on patents and therefore, entrepreneurs have higher incentive to innovate. However, 
countries with high corruption and low enforcement of law will affect diffusion of 
knowledge and impede innovation. Research shows that corruption and abuse of 
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public power undermines the foundations of institutional trust and consequently 
hinder the innovative ability of entrepreneurs (Anokhin and Schulze 2009). In the 
literature, corruption has been widely used as a proxy for the efficiency of political 
institutions (Mauro 1995; Varsakelis 2006). 
 
Despite the fact that a growing number of studies demonstrate importance of 
national innovation system in developed countries, limited research has been 
conducted to investigate national innovation system approach specific to developing 
countries. Therefore in this study, we choose European and Central Asia (ECA) 
regions to study country specific effect of national innovation system. One reason for 
choosing ECA region is the fact that spatial proximity is an important force which 
facilitate flow of information and knowledge, as documented in the literature on 
innovative activity (Jaffe 1989; de Dominicis, Florax et al. 2012). It has been well 
accepted that geographic proximity aid learning processes through mechanisms of 
knowledge spillovers, especially sticky knowledge. Tacit knowledge is un-codified 
and can only be acquired through the process of social interaction. The chance that 
tacit knowledge is transferred from one region to another region decreased when the 
geographic distance increase. Therefore, the closer a country to other innovative 
countries, the more chance of knowledge transfer between two countries and the more 
likely recipient countries exhibit a high capacity to introduce new products or 
processes. 
 
One of major obstacles currently faced by ECA countries is corruption, which is 
common among emerging countries. Substantial research has demonstrated 
detrimental effect of corruption on economic development. It is well recognized that 
corruption increases agency costs, limits firm’s revenues, undermine institutional trust 
(Mauro 1995) (need to add a new one). However, due to the complex relationships 
and associated data limitations for conducting studies
1
, the direct impact of corruption 
on innovative activity is still not clear based on current empirical studies. Especially, 
entrepreneurs in developing countries often encounter corruption problems, and 
resource was allocated based on the relationship with government, usually through 
bribing. Therefore, it is even more important to investigate whether and to what extent 
                                                     
1
 Only few studies have been related to this issue, and these provide mixed evidence. For example, 
Anokhin et al. (2008) find that countries with higher control of corruption (derived from World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators) are associated with higher number of patents application. 
Mahagaonkar (2008) find that corruption has a positive effect on marketing innovation and negative 
effect on product innovation and organization innovation. 
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corruption adversely affect the innovation activity in emerging countries. To date, this 
research topic has rarely been tested in empirical studies, and our study will fill some 
gaps in the current literature. 
 
The Corruption Perception Index (CPI) is calculated by Transparency 
International and has been widely used as a measure for corruption (Varsakelis 2006). 
CPI is based on survey of business people and industry expert over hundred countries. 
It measures those persons’ perception about the level of corruption in particular 
country. However, this subjective measure may not truly reflect the local situation. 
Instead of using perception, we adopt a real measurement which is collected by World 
Bank. We use firm’s informal payments to government as a measurement of 
corruption. This variable measures the percentage of firms that pay informal payments 
or gift to the public officials in a particular country. 
 
Previous studies on national innovation system have analyzed the impact of 
corruption and FDI on innovation in separate but parallel research paths. In this study, 
we explore how the corruption and FDI together affect the innovation activities in 
ECA countries. This approach distinguishes our study from all previous empirical 
research which only investigate on each factor. To our knowledge, this paper is the 
first one to investigate the impact of FDI and corruption on innovative activities in 
ECA regions.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 The Sample 
The World Bank collection of development indicators covers 256 countries, with 
seven regions over the world. Judged from the demographic distribution of the seven 
regions, we decided to focus on Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region because of its 
abundant data available that enable us to form a more balanced panel data, as 
compared to other regions. More importantly ECA region represent an interesting 
study on the positve spillover effect of FDI on product innovation (measured as the 
number of patents application in the home country) due to its local proximity nature.
2
 
                                                     
2 The diverse yet highly interdependent economies of Europe and Central Asia are a natural experiment in seeing 
how the emerging economies can learn from the developed European countries.  In our sample, advanced 
European countries including: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Finland, Iceland, Norway, 
Portugal, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. 
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Table 1. 57 Countries included in the analysis (1995–2010)           
                    
Albania 
 
Faeroe Islands 
 
Latvia 
 
Serbia 
 Andorra 
 
Finland 
  
Liechtenstein Slovak Republic 
Armenia 
 
France 
  
Lithuania 
 
Slovenia 
 Austria 
 
Georgia 
  
Luxembourg Spain 
 Azerbaijan 
 
Germany 
  
Macedonia, FYR Sweden 
 Belarus 
 
Greece 
  
Moldova 
 
Switzerland 
Belgium 
 
Greenland 
  
Monaco 
 
Tajikistan 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina Hungary 
  
Montenegro Turkey 
 Bulgaria 
 
Iceland 
  
Netherlands Turkmenistan 
Channel Islands 
 
Ireland 
  
Norway 
 
Ukraine 
 Croatia 
 
Isle of Man 
 
Poland 
 
United Kingdom 
Cyprus 
 
Italy 
  
Portugal 
 
Uzbekistan 
Czech Republic 
 
Kazakhstan 
 
Romania 
   Denmark 
 
Kosovo 
  
Russian Federation 
  Estonia  Kyrgyz Republic  San Marino   
 
Our study is based on data from ECA and European countries for the period of 
1995-2010. Number of patent application was used as a measure of innovative activity. 
ECA countries encountered series of transition process from late 1980s to early 1990s. 
Since then, inventive activity has shown a clear increasing trend and this generally 
positive trend has been maintained up to the most recent years for which data are 
available (Figure 2.1). Especially, Russian and Poland shows stronger increase in the 
number of patent application in this period of time.  
 
 
Figure 1. Number of patent applications (1995-2010) 
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Figure 2.1 shows a long-run perspective on ECA patenting by tracking all patent 
applied to State Patent Office (data from World Bank indicator). Selected ECA 
includes: Russia, Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine.  
 
An interesting question that which emerging countries copy innovation from 
European countries is usually lacked in the literature. And the number of patents 
applications in the well developed European countries may impose positive 
externality on ECA countries. In order to answer an interesting question of which 
emerging countries receives positive external benefits from which group of EU 
countries we therefore conduct granger causality test. The variable of interest is the 
number of patent applications. Table 2 shows the empirical findings after examining 
all countries in our sample, detailed statistics are available upon request. The result 
shows that Hungary, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Slovenia, and Estonia all benefits from 
the innovation activities that are initiated by Spain.  
 
Table 2 Granger Causality Test 
      
Spain Germany Belgium 
Hungary Ukraine Turkey 
Czech Republic Rusia Czech Republic 
Ukraine Hungary 
 Slovenia 
  Estonia   
Note: Evidences are based on 5% significance level 
 
Figure 2 Maps of Granger Causality Test Results 
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Table 3 Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Ln (Patent)  5.60  1.82  0.69  10.27  
Ln (R&D Exp/GDP)  0.61  0.38  0.02  1.86  
Ln (Number of Researchers)  7.12  0.74  4.12  8.24  
Ln (Trade)  99.31  31.83  36.55  199.68  
Ln (Education Expenditure) 22.95  1.70  19.22  27.08  
Ln (FDI Inflow) 1.36  0.95  -1.77  3.95  
Corruption (% of firms) 36.54  18.92  3.70  77.42  
Source: World Bank Indicator  
  
 
 
3.2 Methodology 
We now turn to the empirical parts; we focus on panel regression analysis to examine 
the detrminanats of product innovations. Following Cheung and Lin (2004) the 
innovation production function in its empirical form can be represented as: 
 
ittitititikti vvCorrupFDIXPatent   ,,,0,               (1) 
where tiPatent ,  is the number of patent application to quantify the innovation level 
for country i at timet; the larger the number of patent application, the higher the 
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innovation level. tiX , is the matrix for the country’s inputs into the R&D activities.  
iv  is the fixed effect for province i, tv is the time dummy, and it is the idiosyncratic 
disturbance. The idiosyncratic disturbances are assumed to be uncorrelated across the 
countries. Innovation is a knowledge creation process, the more the inputs the hihger 
the chance of success. Therefore the measure of inputs to R&D activities ( tiX , ) 
includes:  
 
1. NUMBER OF R&D RESEARCHERS 
 
The variable measures the number of personnel (experts) in the R&D sector, it proxy 
the labour input to the R&D activity.  We expect positive association bewteen this 
control variable and the number of patents applications.  
 
2. R&D EXPENDITURE PER CAPITA GDP 
 
This variabe measures the R&D intensity, it proxy not only the quantity of resources 
deveotd into the R&D activities but also the quality of capital and human resources 
into R&D processes.  Following Cheung and Ping (2004) we use the amount of 
expenditures spend on R&D sectors to poxy the resources, such as technicians, 
equipments and scientists that used to create new knowledge. We again expect 
positive association between this variable and innovation.  
 
 
3. EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION 
Since general eduxation is the foundation of any innovation activities, therefore we 
use exenditures on education , which was genrally ignored in the literature to proxy 
the positive externality effect of genral education as a public goods. We expect postive 
relatiohsop between this variable and the inoovation outcome. 
 
4. OPENNESS 
Here we also include the variable “OPENESS” , defined as the summation of imports 
and exports, to test if domestic firms can benenfit in domestic innovation from 
participating in the ovrseas markt. Hoever we expect this effect is week and even 
negative. Cheung and Ping (2004) finds that FDI firms with larger export–output 
shares cannot signigicantly benefit from intrnational trade because the FDI firms 
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come to China only to utilize its cheap labor, and hence the technologies they bring in 
are mostly labor intensive and the spillover effects on domestic innovation is not 
strong. In our study FDI firms’s export to GDP ratio is generally not avaible for ECA 
coutnries. Therefore we expect even a negative effect assocaited with innovation and 
openss becuase most of these emerging markets only perform labor intensive process 
and lack of incentive to do its own nnovation if their economy is too much relie on 
exporting labor-intensive peoducts. Moreover, trade can pose negative impact on 
innovation through competition
3
.  
 
Turning to FDI, as we discueed extensively spillover effects of FDI may have positive 
influence on the number of domestic patent application. However the uncertainty of 
this hypothsis come from two sources. First this assumed association all depends on 
the form of ownership structure of the enterprises.  Obviosuly,  foreign joint 
ventures and cooperative businesses are able to gnerate positve spillover effect than 
exclusively foreign-owned enterprises for instance. More importantly corruption may 
trigger FDI and hence the effect of FDI on innovation may be biased when the vaiable 
of corruption is ommited. Therefore in our empirical regression model we include the 
variable of corporate corruption ( tiCorrup, ), which measures the percentage of firms 
that pay informal payment or gift to the public officials in a particular counry.  As we 
emphasized in the literature, there is lack of research on the association of corporate 
corruption and innovation activities, espcially for the emerging markets, where 
resource allocation is often shaped by political connection. As a result, it is important 
to know whether and to what extent corruption is adversely affect the innovation 
activity of in emerging countries. To date, the impacts of corruption on innovation 
have rarely been empirically tested. In this paper, we aim to fill some gaps in the 
existing literature by focusing on whether corruption can adversely affect the 
innovation ability of firms in ECA region. In contrast to emerging markets, 
anti-corruption programs and regulations are well-established in the developed 
countries alike Western Euoropen countries like Germeny and France. Unfortunately 
the corporate corruption data is not avaible for developed countries, otherwise it 
would be interesting to conduct a compartive study to compare the impact of 
corporate corruption for emerging and developed markets. 
 
                                                     
3
  As noted by Onodera (2008), an increase in competition can have both positive and negative effects 
on innovation depending on levels of existing competition, nature of the industry, and existing levels of 
technology. 
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4. Empirical Result 
 
    Several estimation methods are considered in this study.  Column 1, 3, and 5 of 
table 4 shows the baseline random effect estimation
4
 of determinants of innovation 
activities countries from ECA region.  Several empirical findings are apparent. 
Column 1 shows the baseline modeling of the determinants (control variables) of 
product innovation. In general we observe positive correlation between R&D 
personnel and innovation activities, even though only model 3 is statistically 
significant at 10% level, while the coefficient in model 1 is marginally significant. For 
all random effects models, the expenditure on R&D intensity has positive impact on 
product innovation, indicating that the success rate of innovation becomes higher 
when the country devotes larger amount of resources to the sector, and the results are 
expected and consistent with the existing literature. However, there is no guarantee of 
having more innovations even when more human capital, as measured by the number 
of researchers is working in the sector.  The estimate for public expenditure on 
education is positive and statistically significant at 1% level, supporting the 
hypothesis that the higher the investment of a society in general education, the more 
efficient the innovation sector will become, as positive externality exists.  The 
negative impact of openness on innovation activities is observed, and this finding 
implies that the negative effect on innovation raised from increase in competition 
outweighs its positive contribution to innovation activities. As suggested by Onodera 
(2008), the mixed effects of openness on innovation depending on levels of existing 
competition, nature of the industry, and existing levels of technology.  
 
Table 4: Determinants of Innovation  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 RE SGMM RE SGMM RE SGMM 
Number of 
R&D 
Researchers 
0.466 -0.0707 0.460
*
 -0.378 0.191 0.548 
 [1.64] [-0.14] [1.69] [-1.02] [0.59] [0.42] 
       
                                                     
4
 We use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the country level, such that the 
computed t-values have been taken into account of the within-country but between-year correlation. 
The Hausman specification test indicates that the random effect model should be used. Results are not 
shown here to save space.  
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R&D 
EXPENDITURE 
0.422
**
 0.105 0.469
***
 0.325 1.080
***
 -0.380 
 [2.27] [0.30] [2.71] [0.78] [2.67] [-0.10] 
       
OPENESS -0.00996
***
 -0.0214
**
 -0.0105
***
 -0.0207
***
 -0.00985 0.00924 
 [-4.00] [-2.21] [-3.88] [-2.73] [-1.57] [0.58] 
       
EXPENDITURE 
ON 
EDUCATION 
0.384
***
 0.824
***
 0.365
***
 0.803
***
 0.738
***
 1.138
***
 
 [3.85] [5.85] [3.65] [6.29] [7.14] [3.06] 
       
FDI INFLOW   0.0583
*
 0.0889 0.0891 -0.254 
   [1.94] [1.22] [0.88] [-0.30] 
       
CORRUPTION 
OF FIRMS 
    0.0132
*
 0.0438
***
 
     [1.92] [2.94] 
       
Constant 0.394 -9.667
***
 1.068 -7.562
*
 -6.494
***
 -20.05 
 [0.21] [-3.75] [0.61] [-1.86] [-3.13] [-1.48] 
Observations 401 380 392 371 51 51 
Adjusted R
2
 0.570  0.505  0.815  
AR(2) 
p-value 
 0.178  0.138  0.143 
Hansen 
p-value 
 0.418  0.639  0.539 
t statistics in brackets; 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
 
   We now turn our focus to the spillover effect of FDI on innovation. It seems that 
the positve spillover effect of FDI exists; however, this effect disappears once we 
include the variable of corporate corruption. Conlumn 5 reveals the fact that the 
higher the percentage of firms that pay informal payment or gift to the public officials 
in a particular counry, the higher is the number of patents applications.  This finding 
is not surprising since resource allocation is often shaped by political connection, and 
firm’s innovation is no exception. Therefore, we conclude that innovation activities in 
the ECA region cannot truly reflect the innovation outcomes because the numbers of 
patents applications is connected to corruption activities. Corruption can adversely 
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affect the innovation ability of firms in ECA region. The job of patent exminers is to 
examine whether the claimed innvenion application should be granted the patent. The 
quality of patents applications are adversely affected because the salary of the patent 
examiners are not high in emerging countries. Also, the growth of corruption , 
nepotim, non-transparent practices, and non-accountability of admistractive officers 
who are in power also cause inefficieny of the patent office in assessing and 
approving patent applications. Therefore it is important to establish an effective 
anti-corruption compliance program in order to prevent and detect patents 
applications which are not up to standard. We can conclude that R&D intensity is the 
most important determinat of innovaton actvity, followed by expenditure on 
education.  
 
For robustness check of findings for the estimates reported in Table 4 using 
random effects method (column 2,4, and 6 in table 4), we adopt Windmeijer (2005) 
general method of moment (SGMM) system panel data estimator, with the two-step 
finite-sample correction, to deal with the handle possible endogenity of the 
independent variables, raised possibly from simultaneity bias, reverse causality and 
omitted variables. In our case the more open is the international trade (openness), it 
may stimulate more domestic innovation in face of intense competition. However the 
reverse causality can happen; whereas more innovations may create more trade 
opportunities. The same may happen for the relationship between corporate 
corruption and innovation. It may be in the direction that more patent applications 
attract more frequent bribery activity. And the use of GMM estimation can overcome 
the endogeneity bias, and control for fixed effects and time effects, and multiple 
endogenous variables. In our paper we use system GMM because the conventional 
dynamic GMM coefficients will be biased for small samples if the series are near unit 
root processes, and the instruments variables are weak.  
 
In order to check for the consistency of the GMM estimator, we use Hansen test to 
detect overall validity of the instruments, under the null hypothesis that the residuals 
and instrumental variables are not correlated. In our model we also perform a second 
order autocorrelation test for the residuals, to test whether second order serial 
correlation exists in the estimation models. As we can see the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable gives rise to autocorrelation, with correlation of 0.991 between 
patents applications and its first lag. We used the “xtabond2” Stata routine developed 
by Roodman (2005). The explanatory power of the random effects model is quite 
satisfactory, with R
2
 of 0.815 after taking into the effect of corporate corruption. (See 
column 5, table 4) However, the results for GMM estimates are also provided for 
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robustness checking because of the potential endogeneity problem. This study uses a 
two-step estimator, which is asymptotically efficient and robust to any pattern of 
cross-correlation and heteroskedasticity (Roodman, 2006).  Even though there seems 
no prior knowledge regarding exogeneity of regressors we use the number of telphone 
line as the IV. The corrleation coefficient between numbers of telephone lines and 
corruption is -0.573 while the correlation coefficient between numbers of telephone 
lines and patents applications is 0.222.  The result of the SGMM estimation is shown 
in the column 2, 4 and 6 of Table 4.  The validiy if IVs are checked by using 
Autocorrelation AR(2) test, and Hansen test. The instruments used in the model are 
valid as we can see from the results of the above two tests. When we compared the 
results of SGMM (column 6) with the FE results (column 5) we find that expenditure 
on R&D activity and numbers of personnel are not significant for the number of 
patents applications. Interstingly the coefficient and its statistical significance 
increases in the SGMM estimation, and this result futher concide with our argument 
that the numbr of patents applications are not an accuartate indicator of innovation 
activities. Instead higher number of patents applications in emerging economy is 
associated with bribery. Our empirical results regarding the relationship between 
patents applications and corporate corruption is robust for a variety of models. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As the world becomes flat, the interests in entering global markets have surged 
phenomenally. Since markets differ significantly in their business environments, firms 
are cautious in choosing which market to enter. In this study, we attempt to provide a 
deeper understanding of how countries differ with respect to their innovations. 
Specifically, we investigated the effects of FDI, corruption and educational 
expenditure on innovation. Using World Bank’s archival dataset that contains 57 
countries, we found that FDI, educational expenditure, and corporate bribery are 
positively related to innovations. The interesting finding of positive effect of bribery 
on patents applications posts caution on the fact that corruption hinders the real 
innovation activities.   
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